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BECENT CASES
W. E. 670. This is true whether the omitted action was discre-
tionary or mandatory. Lindauer v. Pease, 192 Ill. 458, 61 N. E.
454; Wilson v. Vance, 55 Ind. 394; Klein v. Southern Pac. Co.,
140 Fed. 213; see 29 Cyc. 1516. A formal judgment rendered,
but not entered because of negligence or mistake of the clerk,
may be entered by a nunc pro tune order at a subsequent term of
court, provided the evidence of the rendition thereof is sufficient.
Schoonover v. Baltimore and Ohio R. R. Co., 69 W. Va. 560, 73
S. E. 266; Vance v. Railway Co., 53 W. Va. 338, 44 S. E. 461. In
West Virginia the rule is the same when the unrecorded motion
was on a preliminary question. Scott v. Newell, 69 W. Va. 118,
70 S. E. 1092. A nunc pro tune order is valid to supply a failure
of the court's records to show that a motion was made, entertained
and continued, where the order shows appearance of the parties,
and argument therein, and there is nothing to contradict the facts
so certified by the court. Cole v. State of West Virginia, 73 W.
Va. 410, 80 S. E. 487; Stampfle v. Bush, 71 W. Va. 659, 77 S. E.
283; Vance v. Railway Co., supra. The above cases show that
there are but two classes of cases where nunc pro tune orders are
entered: (1) Where an order was in fact made, or some action
taken by the court which was not at the time formally entered of
record, and (2) where the party litigant was entitled to have cer-
tain relief at a particular date, and the failure to grant it at that
time was due to some delay or omission upon the part of the court.
The authorities are very discordant concerning what evidence will
justify the court in finding that previous judicial action had been
taken. The courts of Alabama, and Missouri adhere firmly to the
rule that an entry nunc pro tune can only be made upon showing
some entry or memorandum in or among the records, or quasi-
records of the court, and that parol evidence cannot be received.
Ex Parte Jones, 61 Ala. 399; Evans v. Fisher, 26 Mo. 541. This
rule prevails in other states. Hegeler v. Nenckel, 27 Cal. 491;
Adams v. Re Qua, 22 Fla. 250, 1 Am. St. Rep. 191; Cairo; etc.
R. R. Co. v. Holbrook, 72 Ill. 419; Ludlow v. Johnson, 3 Ohio 553,
17 Am. Dec. 609. On the other hand, some authorities hold that
an entry may be made nunc pro tune on any satisfactory evidence.
Frink v. Frink, 43 N. H. 508; Rugg v. Parker, 7 Gray 172; Weed
v. Weed, 25 Conn. 337; Miller v. Royce, 60 Ind. 189; Bobo v.
State, 40 Ark. 224. The West Virginia court appears to agree
with the latter cases, and will enter a nunc pro tune order upon
any competent legal evidence. Cole v. State, supra. Upon con-
sideration of the function and nature of nunc pro tune orders, the
principal case appears to be sound in principle and in accord with
the weight of authority.
TRESPASS - CUTTING TIlBER - DAMAGES - INNOCENT CONVER-
SION.- In an action of trover for the conversion of standing tim-
ber, which the defendant had manufactured into lumber, it was
found that the trespass was committed under a bona fide claim of
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title. Held, that the damages were "the value of the trees as they-
stood immediately before they were severed from the land."
Wood v. Weaver, 92 S. E. 1001 (Va. 1917).
Where timber trees are converted bona fide and their value
thereby enhanced, the proper measure of damages in an action of
trover is in dispute. The great weight of authority is in accord
with the principal case in holding that the measure of damages is
the stumpage value. Gates v. Rifle Boom Co., 70 Mich. 309, 38 N.
W. 245; Whitney v. Huntington, 37 Minn. 197, 33 N. W. 561; Ross
v. Scott, 15 Lea (Tenn.) 479; Wooden-ware Company v. United
States, 106 U. S. 432. The same has been held in West Virginia
in an action of trespass. Darnell v. Wilmoth, 69 W. Va. 704, 709,
72 S. E. 1023. In accordance with the same rule, the weight of
authority holds that where ore or coal are converted by a bona fide
trespasser, the measure of damages is the value of the ore or coal
in place before severance. Chamberlain v. Collinson, 45 Ia. 429,
436; Stockbridge Iron Co. v. Cone Iron Works, 102 Mass. 80, 86;
Keys v. Pgh. & W. Coal Co., 58 Ohio St. 246, 50 N. E. 911;
Forsyth v. Wells, 41 Pa. 291, 294; Coal Creek M. & M. Co. v.
Moses, 15 Lea (Tenn.) 300. The same has been held as to oil. Dyke
v. National Transit Co., 22 App. Div. 360,49 N. Y. Supp. 180. Some
states determine this value in the case of coal by the usual royalty
paid. Lyons v. Central Coal and Coke Co., 239 Mo. 626, 144 S. W.
503. These holdings as to bona fide conversion of timber, coal, ore
and oil are in accord with the principle that damages should be
only compensation for loss suffered. See 1 SUTHERLAND, DAmAGE ,
4 ed. §12. The action of trover is for convenience, and not to en-
able the plaintiff to recover an unjust amount where the defendant
is innocent. Forsyth v. Wells, 41 Pa. 291. The doctrine of quasi-
contractual recoupment, which allows the innocent converter the
value of his services not in excess of the resulting increase in the
value of the property gives a satisfactory theoretical basis for this
result in actions of trover and prevents a conflict with the rule
that the measure of damages. in actions of trover is the value at
the time and place of conversion. Dartmouth College v. Interna-
tional Paper Co., 132 Fed. 92. Some states hold to the technical
vievi that since there can be no conversion until there has been
severance from the realty, therefore the damages for innocent con-
version must be fixed as of that time. In accordance with this
view, a minority of states hold the measure of damages, where trees
are cut by an innocent trespasser, is their value immediately after
severance. White v. Yawkey, 108 Ala. 270, 19 So. 360; Stearns
Coal & Lumber Co. v. Boyatt, 168 Ky. 111, 181 S. W. 962; Moody
v. Whitney, 38 Me. 174, 61 Am. Dec. 239; Wall v. Holloman, 156 N.
C. 275, 72 S. E. 369; Beede v. Lamprey, 64 N. H. 510, 115 Atl. 133,
10 Am. St. Rep. 426. But in these cases, the plaintiff is not per-
mitted to recover for increased value from transportation. Wright
v. Skinner, 34 Fla. 453, 463, 16 So. 335; Beede v. Lamprey, 64 N.
H. 510, 15 Atl. 233, 10 Am. St. Rep. 426. In accordance with the
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same view, the measure of damages for innocent conversion of coal
has been held to be its value after severance from the realty. Ivy
Coal & Coke Co. v. Alabama Coal &Coke Co., 135 Ala. 579, 33 So.
547; McLean County Coal Go. v. Lennon, 91 Ill. 561, 33 Am. St.
Rep. 64. There are several objections to the minority view of the
measure of damages for bona fide conversion of lumber 6r coal.
First, it is contrary to the fundamental principle that the damages
allowed should not exceed compensation for the injury sustained.
Forsyth v. Wells, supra; see 1 SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES, 4 ed. § 12.
Second, the plaintiff is unjustly enriched, while the defendant is
deprived of improvements made bona fide. Dartmouth College
v. International Paper Go., 132 Fed. 92; see 18 HARV. L. REV. 305.
Third, "although the defendant's wrongful act was in reality a
trespass upon real estate, the plaintiff recovers a greater amount
than the damage to the realty, and a greater amount than he could
recover in an action of trespass." See SEDGWICK, DAMAGES, 9 ed.
§ 500. This is recognized in the following cases: White v. Yaw-
key, 108 Ala. 270, 19 So. 360, ,54 Am. St. Rep. 159, 32 L. R. A.
199; Omaha G. S. & R. Co. v. Tabor, 13 Colo. 41, 21 Pac. 925, 930,
16 Am. St. Rep. 185; Skinner v. Pinney, 19 Fla. 42, 49, 45 Am.
Rep. 1; Foote v. Merrill, 54 N. H. 490, 20 Am. Rep. 151. Where
conversion is by a wilful trespasser, the authorities are practically
unanimous in following the dictum in the principal case that the
plaintiff is entitled to the value of the trees in their improved
state. Smith Timber Co. v. Auld, 218 Fed. 824; Cummings &
Co. v. Masterson, 42 Tex. Civ. App. 549, 93 S. W. 500; Bailey v.
Hayden, 65 Wash. 57,-117 Pac. 720, 721; Wooden-ware Co. v.
United States, 106 U. S. 432; Pine River Logging Co. v. United
States, 186 U. S. 279, 293. The same rule has been applied to coal.
Sunnyside Coal and Coke Co. v. Reitz, 14 Ind. App. 478, 43 N. B.
46, and also as to ore. Patchen v. Keelley, 19 Nev. 404, 14 Pac.
347. If the, conversion is wilful, the defendant's mata fides pre-
vents his securing any right of recoupment on quasi-contractual
grounds for increase in value from his efforts and permits the
technical rule as to damages in trover to apply. Dartmouth Col-
lege v. International Paper Co., supra; see 20 HARv. L. REV. 227;
18 HARv. L. REv. 305. Since a wilful converter makes improve-
ments knowingly, he takes the risk of losing his labor.
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